University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

April 2021

Analysis of Denial of Service Attacks in Emerging Software
Defined Network Infrastructures
Andrea P. Wright
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Wright, Andrea P., "Analysis of Denial of Service Attacks in Emerging Software Defined Network
Infrastructures" (2021). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/8891

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar
Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Analysis of Denial of Service Attacks in
Emerging Software Defined Network Infrastructures

by

Andrea P. Wright

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Electrical Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Nasir Ghani, Ph.D.
Sylvia Thomas, Ph.D.
Zhuo Lu, Ph.D.
Sriram Chellappan, Ph.D.
Tao Zhang, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
March 26, 2021

Keywords: Queuing Theory for Attack Mitigation, Virtualization,
Packet Forwarding, Data Availability, Intelligent Networking
Copyright c 2021, Andrea P. Wright

Dedication
“I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me,” Philippians 4:13. This dissertation is dedicated to my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, because 1st Corinthians 3:23 says,
“and you are Christ’s and Christ’s is God’s.” It was nothing but constant prayers and faith
in God that He carried me through the challenges I faced. God is a God of grace and mercy.
Thank you Lord, for your blessings.
Ms. Elisa A. Mayes, you are such a blessing. I am so grateful God placed us around each
other. Your friendship has carried me through the Ivy League, Division I basketball and track
scholarships, a Master’s education, and this Ph.D. Thank you for the keys to the bakery.
Thank you to Mrs. Kimberly Bissohong, Mr. Christopher Reed, Ms. Stasia Ploskanka, Ms.
Deanna Young, Ms. Berthel Tate and Ms. Jennifer Thomas for the encouragement over
the years. You all kept believing in me and it pushed me to be better and keep “sprinting”
towards the finish line. To my prayer partners Dr. Elysia Ross and LT Lauren Foreman, we
did it! The Roosevelt Way. I thank God for your continuous prayers, and your sistership.
God continues to pour his favor over us, let’s keep walking in His light and shining it for the
world to see. Mrs. Ashton Smith and Mr. Bruce Smith, you two have always had a smile
on your faces, and it always brightens my day. You both pick me up even when you don’t
know it. Thank you! Big A, thanks for taking me in and staying with me through the years.
We’re having fun this year, and every year! To my loved ones, may they rest in Heaven, Mr.
Philip T. Reid, Mr. Gary Davenport, Mr. Adam Smith, Uncle William (Butch) Adside. To
everyone that has prayed for me throughout the years. It is truly a blessing. Thank you.
To my mother Dr. Sandra A. Wright, my father Mr. Sherman O. Wright, my sisters
Glenecia Cain and Annette Varoz, my brother Mr. Sherman O. Wright II, my cousin Ms.
Marcie Wright, Aunt Kris, Uncle Ernie, and my entire family, I love you with all my heart,
you all have been my solid support system and we can finally say, we are PhinishD!

Acknowledgments
I acknowledge the Florida Education Fund (FEF) and McKnight Doctoral Fellows, as
well as the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for their academic funding and support. The views
and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted
as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied of FEF or the
Sloan Foundation. Mr. Bernard Batson, Dr. Lawrence Morehouse, Mr. Jackson, and Mrs.
Reddick have been very instrumental in my progress towards the Ph.D.
From the University of South Florida, I would like to thank Dr. Calvin Perumalla for
collaborating on research with the Internet of Things (IoT). I would also like to acknowledge
Dr. Jean-Baptiste Subils for his contributions to the University of South Florida dissertation
format template.
Special thank you to my Black Graduate and Professional Student Association, University
of New Mexico Chapter mentors and friends who have always encouraged and pushed me to
success, Mr. James (Jay) Tillman III, Dr. Sonja N. Robinson, Dr. George A. Williams Jr.,
and Dr. Marla Wyche.
Lastly, I would like to sincerely thank my professor, Dr. Nasir Ghani, and my mentors,
Dr. Sylvia Thomas, and Dr. Rampaul Hollington for the encouragement and guidance along
the way.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

iii

List of Figures

iv

Abstract

vi

Chapter 1:
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

Introduction
Background
Motivation
Problem Statement
Proposed Work and Thesis Contributions

Chapter 2:
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6

Literature Review
Background
Data Plane Concerns
Control Plane Concerns
Application Plane Concerns
Queuing Analysis of DoS Attacks
Open Challenges

1
1
2
6
6
8
8
11
13
16
19
20

Chapter 3: Queuing Models for DoS/DDoS Attacks on SDN Control Plane
3.1 Model Overview and Notation
3.2 Queuing Model Analysis
3.2.1 Baseline SDN Controller Configuration: Single Queue
3.2.2 Intelligent SDN Controller Configuration: Dual Queue
3.3 Performance Analysis Results

22
23
26
26
28
30

Chapter 4:
4.1
4.2
4.3

40
40
42
43

Mitigation Strategies for DoS/DDoS Attacks
Model Overview and Notation
Queuing Model Analysis
Performance Analysis Results

Chapter 5: Real-World Testbed Evaluation
5.1 NSF GENI Testbed Setup
5.2 Evaluation Study
5.2.1 Baseline (Normal) Traffic

48
49
51
51
i

5.2.2
5.2.3
Chapter 6:
6.1
6.2
6.3

Malicious Attack Traffic
Sample Results

52
52

Conclusions and Future Directions
Conclusions
Findings Summary
Future Work Directions

54
54
54
55

References

57

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

62

Appendix B: Variable Definitions
B.1 Chapter 3
B.2 Chapter 4

65
65
65

Appendix C: Overview of Queuing Simulation Toolkit

67

Appendix D: Copyright Permissions

71

Appendix E: Biography

72

ii

List of Tables

Table 2.1

Existing SDN DoS/DDoS Protection Solutions by Layer

21

Table 5.1

1 sec benign traffic ping interval (hosts h1-h5)

53

Table 5.2

0.2 sec benign traffic ping interval (hosts h1-h5)

53

iii

List of Figures

Figure 1.1

Overview of SDN architecture and Layers c 2019 IEEE

3

Figure 1.2

SDN market projections (from Global Market Insights [1])

5

Figure 2.1

Southbound Controller-to-Switch Communication

9

Figure 2.2

Visualization of DoS/DDoS attack threats on SDN Layers

10

Figure 3.1

Overview of Baseline SDN Controller Framework (Single FCFS
Queuing)

23

Overview of Intelligent SDN Controller Framework for DDoS/DoS
Attack Mitigation (Separate Queuing of Benign and Attack Traffic)

24

MATLAB R Simuevents Model Topology for Sample 3 Node SDN
Network

31

Average Wait Time: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Service Times

32

Average Num. Requests: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign
Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Service Times

32

Figure 3.6

Sample Request Processing Times at SDN Controller

33

Figure 3.7

Sample Buffer Length at SDN Controller

34

Figure 3.8

Average Wait Time: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

35

Average Num. Requests: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign
Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

35

Average Wait Time: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign
Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Service Times

37

Average Num. Requests: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Service Times

37

Figure 3.2

Figure 3.3

Figure 3.4

Figure 3.5

Figure 3.9

Figure 3.10

Figure 3.11

iv

Figure 3.12

Average Wait Time: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign
Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

38

Average Num. Requests: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load, Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

39

Figure 4.1

Overview of edge buffering of packet lookup requests

41

Figure 4.2

Average wait time: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential arrival and service times

45

Average num. requests: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential arrival and service times

45

Average wait time: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential arrival and fixed service times

47

Average num. requests: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential arrival and fixed service times

47

Figure 5.1

5 switch/5-host SDN topology slice in NSF GENI testbed

49

Figure 5.2

Screenshot of jFed toolkit and GUI views

50

Figure C.1

MATLAB R SimEvents sample M/M/1 queue

69

Figure C.2

MATLAB R SimEvents library browser

69

Figure C.3

Sample output simulation runs from MATLAB R SimEvents

70

Figure D.1

Global Market Insights Copyright Approval

71

Figure 3.13

Figure 4.3
Figure 4.4
Figure 4.5

v

Abstract
Software defined networking (SDN) improves upon traditional networking protocol technologies by decoupling the data and control planes and moving all control provisioning
decisions to a centralized SDN controller entity. This concept has matured over the last
decade, having gained strong industry traction, and is now being widely deployed within
enterprise and carrier networks to streamline network services provisioning and reduce costs.
Overall, centralized control delivers much more cost-effective and flexible networking setups
that can support a wide range of customized user-driven network management applications,
e.g., traffic engineering, security, survivability, admission control, policy control, etc.
However, the separation of the data and control layers in a SDN network introduces many
attack points for malicious users to exploit. Some key examples include (distributed) denial
of service (DoS/DDoS), intrusion, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In particular,
the former types are of particular concern to network operators as they can effectively shut
down vital communications between the SDN controller and their distributed data plane
switching nodes/platforms. Moreover, the ongoing proliferation of lower cost Internet of
Things (IoT) devices is further increasing the magnitude and scale of potential DoS attacks.
For example, recent IoT-driven DDoS amplification attacks have generated malicious data
flows with terabit level speeds, a very sobering reality.
Given the increasing sophistication of DoS attacks and the vulnerability of SDN controllers, the effective modeling (characterization) and mitigation of DoS/DDoS attacks in
SDN-based infrastructures is a vital concern. Although various studies have addressed this
problem area, there is a further need to develop more formalized analytical models to characterize the impact of DoS/DDoS attacks on the SDN control plane. As a result, this
vi

dissertation develops and analyzes novel queuing theoretic models to address this concern
for baseline (simplified) SDN controllers, as well as more advanced designs that implement
traffic classification and separation to improve security. The impact of attack mitigation
strategies in data plane switches is also addressed to evaluate traffic control at the network
edge. Finally, an initial testbed setup is also built using the NSF Global Environment for
Network Innovations (GENI) infrastructure to further study DoS/DDoS attacks on the SDN
control plane. Overall, this work provides a strong basis for characterizing DoS/DDoS attacks on SDN infrastructures and can be used to develop appropriate mitigation strategies.

vii

Chapter 1: Introduction

The focus of this dissertation is on the study of large-scale DoS/DDoS attacks in emerging
SDN infrastructures. The overall goal is to leverage and apply methodologies from queuing theory to model the impact of such specialized attacks and then use them to better
understand congestion behaviors and also guide the development of appropriate mitigation
strategies. In light of this, the opening chapter highlights the specific security threats in
SDN-based networks and outlines the key motivations for this effort. The core outline of the
dissertation is detailed next, along with an outline of its main constituent chapters.

1.1

Background
Computer networks and information technology (IT) systems now represent a critical

component of the modern infrastructure. Indeed, many industries and consumers rely on a
constant connection to the Internet to continuously deliver data and services. Furthermore,
the advent of new paradigms such as big data and cloud computing is further accelerating the
demands on networked infrastructures. Other key drivers also include the growing pool of
mobile devices as well as networked Internet of Things (IoT) sensor platforms being deployed
in an increasingly wide range of roles.
As more and more users and corporations migrate their businesses and operations online,
service quality and network security have become key requirements. In particular, enterprises
and network providers have to maintain crucial quality of service (QoS) support for stringent
data transfers, e.g., such as real-time voice and video, virtual private networks (VPN), storage
transfers, etc. In addition, the secure and reliable operation of network IT infrastructures is
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another important requirement. Indeed, a wide range of cyber threats are already impacting
daily operations, e.g., such as (distributed) denial of service (DoS/DDoS), intrusion, and
man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. Note that DDoS attacks are similar to DoS attacks but
leverage multiple sources to carry out the attack vector. Overall, DoS/DDoS attacks are
a major concern today as they can disrupt networks and usurp end-users’ availability and
access to data and services. As such, these challenges are placing increasing demands for
more effective technology solutions and tools. However, many enterprise and even carrier
networks still make extensive use of legacy routing and switching technologies. These systems
operate in a distributed, decentralized manner making it much harder and costly to meet
QoS requirements for end user services and applications. It is here that many providers
are starting to look at software defined networking (SDN) technologies to help streamline
services provisioning and lower costs.

1.2

Motivation
As noted above, modern networks must provide robust support for a broad range of user

traffic types. Now early offerings from network equipment vendors lacked key provisions
for QoS support. As a result, many vendors have added a wide range of capabilities and
innovations to improve QoS support over the years, such as scheduling, buffer control, fast
switching fabrics, etc. Nevertheless, despite these improvements, service provisioning remains
a challenging concern, as network operators are limited to the control and management
software provided by vendors. In many cases, these propriety solutions are not able to meet
the rapidly changing needs for today’s users. As a result, the concept of SDN was evolved
about 10 years ago to help streamline network control provisioning operation.
Figure 1.1 presents and overview of the SDN architecture approach. In particular, the
main innovation here is to decouple the data and control planes and simplify the complexity
of routers and switches. Namely, this architecture consists of the following three planes:
2

Figure 1.1: Overview of SDN architecture and Layers c 2019 IEEE
• Data Plane: This layer is tasked with forwarding data packets and comprises of packet
switching devices, commonly referred to as switches. Each switch communicates with
its SDN controller and has a lookup table for storing incoming forwarding rules. In
particular, these rules govern how traffic destined to a specific address is to be handled,
i.e., buffered, prioritized, tagged, scheduled.
• Control Plane: This layer is embodied by a centralized SDN controller entity (server)
as well as the associated network operating system (NOS) and protocols to interact
with the data plane switches. This controller maintains a global view of the network
and is responsible for all key provisioning activities, e.g., such as routing, security,
management, etc.
• Application Plane: This layer consists of a wide range of applications running on the
SDN controller. These applications can leverage the centralized view of the network
and its traffic patterns to effectively implement a wide range of provisioning strategies
for end users.
3

Comprehensively, centralized SDN-based control offers many advantages over older proprietary vendor-specific provisioning solutions. Most notably, this setup reduces cost and
greatly simplifies the complexity of data plane switches (which no longer have to run complex
distributed protocols). In addition, the SDN application plane allows operators to implement
their own objectives and provides a key improvement over proprietary vendor-specific provisioning software, also, termed as programmability. For this reason, system operators can now
program customized applications to run on a centralized SDN controller and then simply
push the desired forwarding rules (to implement the preferred functionalities) on to switches
over southbound protocols. Clearly, such streamlined programmability enables much faster,
responsive end-user services support. As a result, a truly wide range of SDN-based applications have been developed, e.g., QoS-based routing, advanced cybersecurity threat detection
and mitigation, IoT device management and data aggregation, service billing, etc. In particular, SDN-based control setups are being touted as a major component of IoT-based data
collection and management designs.
Overall, the SDN sector has seen many advances over the years. For example, a heap of
controller-to-switch communication protocol solutions have been developed, e.g., OpenFlow,
NETCONF, OpenContrail, Open vSwitch Database (OVDSB), etc. A range of commensurate
network operating systems have also been developed, e.g., such as Open Network Operating
System (ONOS), OpenDaylight (ODL), Floodlight, Ryu, NOX, and POX. As a result, many
major networking system vendors have embraced SDN and already started to incorporate
it into their product lines. Indeed, overall traction in this space has been strong, and some
market researchers have predicted very high adoption/growth rates of this technology across
the world for the next several years, see Figure 1.2 [1].
However, as expected, any new technology also brings its own set of challenges and
vulnerabilities. With regards to SDN, the notion of a centralized controller managing the
whole network clearly represents a single-point of vulnerability, both from a physical and
4

Figure 1.2: SDN market projections (from Global Market Insights [1])
cyber-threat perspective. With regards to the latter, targeted malicious DoS/DDoS flooding
attacks can be designed to overwhelm this entity and effectively cut off the data plane
devices. Along these lines, researchers have conducted a range of studies on SDN security
for DoS/DDoS attacks. For example, these efforts include schemes that are focused on each
plane in the SDN architecture, i.e., data, control, and application (as surveyed in Sections 2.2,
2.3, and 2.4). Furthermore, some earlier studies have also presented more analytical queuingbased models of DoS attacks in regular distributed routing networks. Building upon this,
some recent initiatives have also introduced queuing models for SDN operation (surveyed in
Section 2.5). Nevertheless, despite the above contributions, there is still a further need to
develop more formalized queuing-type models for DoS/DDoS attacks on the SDN control
plane. In particular, these methods must incorporate the operation of both simplified and
more advanced SDN controller designs with some mitigation capabilities. This forms the
key motivation for this dissertation effort.

5

1.3

Problem Statement
This dissertation focuses on some of the above concerns and develops novel queuing formu-

lations to characterize the behavior of the SDN control plane under DoS/DDoS type attacks.
Specifically, there is a need to develop models for baseline (simplified) SDN controllers as
well as more advanced designs that implement traffic classification and separation to improve security support. The impact of attack mitigation strategies in data plane switches
also needs to be incorporated here.

1.4

Proposed Work and Thesis Contributions
This dissertation addresses the study of DoD/DDoS attacks on emerging SDN-based

networking infrastructures. The major contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• A detailed survey of the latest work in DoS attack modeling and mitigation in SDN
settings. This includes a look at both data and control plane concerns as well as some
queuing models.
• Formulation of novel queuing models to analyze the impact of regular and attack
traffic on the critical SDN control plane operation. This includes models for basic
SDN controllers and more advanced/intelligent SDN controllers using classification
methods to separate benign and malicious traffic requests.
• Formulation of novel queuing models for more advanced switch designs to mitigate
DoS/DDoS attacks at the network edge. This model incorporates traffic classification
methods to separate benign and malicious traffic requests at the data plane.
• Setup of an initial testbed using the NSF Global Environment for Network Innovations
(GENI) infrastructure to further study DoS/DDoS attacks on the SDN control plane.

6

This setup runs a live SDN controller using the Floodlight controller and generates
sample attacks using a variety of tools.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Foremost, a detailed survey of the research work on DoS/DDoS attacks in SDN-based networks is presented in Chapter 2. Next,
Chapter 3 introduces novel queuing models to capture the impact of benign and malicious
traffic on the SDN controller. These models are then analyzed in detail to characterize the
impact of large-scale DoS attacks. Chapter 4 then further leverages and extends these queuing models to analyze more effective mitigation strategies in data plane switches. Finally,
Chapter 5 details the usage of the NSF GENI infrastructure to build a testbed to evaluate
the impact of DoS/DDoS attacks on the SDN control plane in live network settings. Chapter 6 then concludes the dissertation by presenting a summary of the findings along with
promising areas of future work.

7

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The overall topic of SDN network security has been receiving an increasing amount of
focus in recent years. In particular, related studies have looked at both the security of
SDN control planes as well as using SDN-based network infrastructures to implement a wide
range of security features and services. Hence this chapter presents an overview of SDN-based
setups and protocols and then presents a survey of related security concerns, particularly
with regard to DoS/DDoS type attacks on the data and control planes. In addition, this
chapter also reviews various existing studies on queuing analysis of DoS/DDoS attacks in
regular and SDN-based networks.

2.1

Background
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, SDN provides a unique architecture that decouples the

network data and control planes. Namely, this approach separates the entities deciding how
to manage traffic from the devices actually handling the traffic [2, 3, 4]. This is accomplished
through a clear delineation of SDN layers, as shown earlier in Figure 1.1, i.e., data plane,
control plane, and application plane. Overall, this approach allows the whole network to now
be controlled by a single centralized controller, eliminating the need to coordinate control
actions across multiple distributed systems. Also, SDN technologies have seen good traction
in enterprise and datacenter networks. Namely, in traditional datacenter setups, the servers
physically connect to the hardware switches in the datacenter. These setups also couple the
datacenter with the network control center. Meanwhile, in SDN deployments, servers can
now connect to virtual switches, e.g., via the OpenFlow protocol.
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Figure 2.1: Southbound Controller-to-Switch Communication
Given the layered nature of the SDN architecture, a series of application program interfaces (API) have also been defined. In particular, the northbound interface (NBI) allows
software applications to interact with SDN controllers. This interface contains both userfacing and device-facing components. Similarly, the southbound interface (SBI) serves as the
communication path between the SDN controllers and switches. The SBI is equipped with
Layer 2 (Data Layer), Layer 3 (Network Layer), and Layer 4 (Transport Layer) protocols
that allow data-path actions such as packet encapsulation, packet decapsulation, and QoS
support. A detailed look at the SBI is also shown in Figure 2.1. Here, as packets arrive
and depart from the switches, messages are sent to the SDN controller in an asynchronous
manner over the SBI, i.e., these messages denote packet arrivals or switch state changes.
Meanwhile, the SDN controller responds by appropriately adding, deleting, or updated flow
entries in the switch flow tables through the SBI. Now a range of standardized protocols
can be used for communication over the SBI, including OpenFlow [5, 6], Forward and Control Element Separation (forCES) [7, 8], or the Path Computation Element Communication
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Protocol (PCEP) [9, 10]. All of these protocols can help regulate the flow rules for network
traffic, thereby allowing network operators to program explicit routes and processing rules
for different types of traffic and users. Carefully note that flow rule programmability also
provides a critical step in terms of security, as it can be used to mitigate malicious attack
traffic away from the main SDN controller or other data plane switches and hosts. Malicious
users exploit this capability in several SDN security mechanisms, as detailed later in this
chapter.

Figure 2.2: Visualization of DoS/DDoS attack threats on SDN Layers
Indeed, given the decoupled architecture of SDN and its additional communication paths,
malicious users can find and exploit vulnerabilities to launch a range of attacks. In particular, the SDN architecture is susceptible at each layer to a variety of cyber threats, e.g.,
Dos/DDoS, intrusion, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks (see Figure 2.2). Most notably, DoS/DDoS attacks are a major concern as they can limit the availability of resources
10

on the network and thereby disrupt availability and access for end users. Some key examples
of such attacks include User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) flooding attacks, amplification attacks, reflection attacks, and database query attacks [11]. Along these lines, researchers have looked at various solutions here. For example,
many schemes have been proposed for protecting SDN controller, i.e., see related studies
in [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. However, these strategies limit Dos/DDoS attack
mitigation solutions only to the control plane, and hence it is equally important to address
DoS/DDoS concerns from the data and application plane perspectives as well, see Table
Table 2.1.

2.2

Data Plane Concerns
The SDN data plane consists of physical and virtual switches which send packets across

the network. Clearly, these forwarding functions can be disrupted if the data plane is subjected to DoS/DDoS attacks, causing degraded performance for legitimate users. Specifically,
DoS/DDoS attacks in SDN setups generate an overwhelming amount of malicious packets
to be forwarded by the network switches. These platforms can quickly become overwhelmed
and generate an excessive amount of table miss events and ensuing lookup traffic to the
SDN controller (OpenFlow Packet In messages). Additionally, switches can also run out of
memory when storing spurious rules inserted by malicious traffic lookup requests.
Accordingly, various defense strategies have been proposed to protect against DoS/DDoS
attacks in the SDN data plane [21, 22, 23, 24]. In particular, the southbound SBI is used
to control overall traffic flow across the data plane. Hence various efforts have looked at
monitoring underlying flows to control DoS/DDoS attacks. For example, Ambrosin et al.
[23] developed a solution to monitor and proxy each inbound controller connection, called
LineSwitch. This scheme proposes an intrusion prevention system (IPS) solution that protects the control and data planes from malicious Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. More
11

specifically, this proposed mechanism provides mitigation against the synchronization of
flooding DoS attacks, i.e., TCP synchronize flag (SYN) attacks. The LineSwitch module
also implements a blacklist to prevent packet overload. Namely, this entity reviews all inbound TCP traffic from each IP source and drops maliciously flagged traffic. This method
protects against TCP SYN floods and other attacks that use randomized IP addresses. Overall, the authors evaluated their approach using simulated traffic, and showed that LineSwitch
can protect against packet loss during simulated TCP SYN floods. Similarly, the WedgeTail
solution [25] determines which packets should be dropped or forwarded by prioritizing all
packet flows. To note, this scheme incorporates IPS mechanisms and is largely based on
trust control and data plane policies.
Furthermore, Shaghaghi et al. evaluated WedgeTail against OpenFlow Packet In flood
events over various simulated networks. Results show that this solution improved network
flow by reducing packet congestion. Also, Shin et al. proposed another data plane approach,
termed as Avant-Guard [15]. This scheme uses a multi-module solution to handle TCP SYN
floods at the data plane switches. Namely, Avant-Guard connects a module to the SBI and
couples it with a trigger module to alert the system of malicious activity the SDN flow rules.
While Avant-Guard uses a multi-plane concept, the focus of the system is on flow entries at
the data plane. Overall results show this solution can mitigate TCP SYN packet floods at
the control plane. Meanwhile, selective blocking is another strategy that has been proposed
for handling TCP SYN flooding attacks. For example, Mohammadi et al. detail a related
method to protect against route spoofing attacks and DoS attacks [26]. Specifically, an IP
and Ethernet media access control (MAC) address spoofing detection mechanism is added
between the SDN switches and the SBI. This detector is evaluated in a Mininet emulation
environment and results show reduced data packet delays and link congestion. Finally,
additional researchers presented other studies on data plane DoS/DDoS protection as found
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in [27, 28], along with methods to protect the information exchange between the data and
control planes [19, 29].
Carefully note that DoS/DDoS detection in SDN networks is usually done by capturing,
analyzing, and classifying the control messages and raw attack traffic patterns. Typically,
this classification divides the traffic into normal (benign) and attack (malicious) categories.
However, there are few studies that have analyzed real-world DoS/DDoS attack traffic data
sets. Instead, most efforts have used artificially-generated attack traffic in test-bed emulation
or network simulation environments. Now Song et al. presents one of the few studies in
this area which uses a predictive modeling approach for malicious traffic data sets [30].
Overall, incorporating real-world experimental data can greatly improve the effectiveness of
DoS/DDoS detection schemes and provides higher confidence against real-world attacks.

2.3

Control Plane Concerns
The control plane serves as the core intelligence of the SDN setup and contains soft-

ware controller(s) to manage packet forwarding in the underlying data plane. Now in single
controller setups, the controller manages the entire network, i.e., via interactions with applications over the NBI and data plane switches over the SBI. Meanwhile in larger setups,
controller-to-controller communication is also used over eastbound and westbound APIs [31].
Namely, the westbound API allows the SDN control plane to communicate with additional
controllers on other SDN networks. In essence this provides a communication path between
SDN controllers. The eastbound API allows the SDN controller to connect to non-SDN
networks, thereby providing a bridge to interface with legacy control domains.
In light of the above, it is crucial to protect the SDN control plane from DoS/DDoS
attacks [32]. Hence many researchers have tried to address this requirement by developing
schemes to allow uninterrupted traffic transfers. For example, Deng et al. implement a
PacketChecker module that integrates with both the data plane and control plane [16]. This
13

entity runs at the controller, but protects the control plane against packet injection attacks
by detecting anomalies based on the Ethernet MAC addresses and OpenFlow Packet In
message headers. This approach was evaluated in an emulated environment, and showed
reduced delays and processor workload during attack periods. Meanwhile H. Wang et al.
also presented a solution called FloodGuard [17] to protect the controller from saturation
attacks from the data plane. In particular, this scheme used scheduling rules and rate limiting
to control packets transfers. FloodGuard also leveraged a cache to handle table miss entries,
classify packets, and process packets using a first-in-first-out (FIFO) basis. This solution was
evaluated on an emulated SDN test network using a POX controller, OpenFlow switches,
and three hosts. In both test cases, FloodGuard provided effective bandwidth protection
against UDP flooding attacks.
Meanwhile, L. Wang et al. also presented another scheme for control plane congestion
control, termed as Woodpecker [12]. Namely, this scheme implements a congestion detection
mechanism at the controller and uses flow rules and a blacklist to handle malicious packets
and mitigate congestion. This approach was evaluated using real-world SDN topologies
and simulated traffic, and was shown to decrease utilization overheads during link flooding
attacks. Likewise, another flood prevention scheme was also presented in [14] by L. Zhang et
al. using port hopping for moving target DoS mitigation. In particular, port hopping allows
the controller to map available ports to unused ports on the network. Hence this method can
prevent attacks due to the unpredictability of used ports. This solution was evaluated in an
emulated environment using a C/C++ based NOX controller by measuring processor load
and response times under attack. Results showed that port hopping increased processor load
for larger packet lengths, but yielded faster response times during DoS attacks. The ability
to migrate against port scanning makes it increasingly difficult for malicious users to survey
the SDN network and understand its vulnerabilities. Similarly, TopoGuard [4] presented a
method to prevent network topology poisoning, and Xiang et al. tested this solution for link
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fabrication and host hijacking attacks in a simulated environment using the NOX controller
[18]. Additionally, Shang et al. outlined a scheme called FloodDefender that learns the
network to improve attack detection and migrate traffic away from links under attack [19].
This approach uses a multi-module approach on the control plane to perform packet filtering
and flow rule management. Overall, FloodDefender calculates the average queuing delay for
each switch and link on the network and manages table miss entries to lower packet loss
during DoS attacks by reducing control plane processor load. FloodDefender’s effectiveness
was tested against TCP and UDP attacks in an emulated environment, and results confirmed
improved flow table utilization and lower packet loss rates.
Meanwhile, the multi-layer fair queuing (MLFQ) scheme proposed by P. Zhang et al.
uses multiple queues to manage network traffic [20]. Particularly, a software module now
implements a queue at the controller, and multiple dynamic queues are also implemented
at the data plane switches (i.e., based upon the number of switches and ports). Overall,
virtualizing the SDN queues allows the controller to respond to congestion by processing
healthy packets over DoS traffic created by massive amounts of table miss packets and
OpenFlow Packet In messages. The authors evaluate their solution using a Floodlight
controller in an emulated software environment and also over a field programmable gate
array (FPGA) hardware testbed. Findings from the hardware FPGA experiments show
that the MLFQ approach helped maintain fairness between traffic flows on different switch
ports. However, the software emulation tests showed that the scheme suffered from some
switch-level congestion. Additionally, towards the end of the test runs, the MLFQ scheme
did begin to drop malicious OpenFlow Packet In messages and mitigate flooding attacks.
Finally, the work in [33] also proposes to redirect all traffic identified as malicious to a
controlled sandbox environment for further forensic evaluation.
As noted earlier in Chapter 1, there are many different SDN controller packages, e.g.,
ONOS, OpenDayLight (ODL), Floodlight, Ryu, NOX, and POX. For example, both Ryu
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and POX use the Python language, whereas the related, but lesser used, NOX solution is
implemented in C/C++. Meanwhile, the highly popular ONOS solution is designed in Java
and supports a transition between traditional networks and SDN networks. The ODL and
Floodlight controllers are also Java-based controller solutions. Although these many options
provide a lot of flexibility for network operators, they all have different security profiles and
implications. As a result, some research studies have also analyzed these software solutions
from a security standpoint. For example, findings by Arbettu et al. in [34] show that
ODL-based controllers provide better protection against DoS attacks versus Ryu and ONOS
controllers. The authors also found that ONOS and Ryu controllers are more susceptible
to DoS attacks on the respective controllers and SBI. Meanwhile, [35, 36, 37] proposed a
method to prioritize data flow protection at the controller as a form of DoS defense. Since
SDN controllers interact over the SBI, there is constant information exchange with the
underlying physical and virtual switches in the data plane. The authors in [38] also studied
packet flooding attacks using TCPreplay in a small SDN setup with three hosts and different
controllers. The related findings here showed several controllers quickly became exhausted
when the generated traffic exceeded the allotted threshold for packets arriving per second
(i.e., Ryu, ONOS, and Floodlight).

2.4

Application Plane Concerns
As per Figure 1.1, the SDN application layer is comprised of user applications, e.g., for

routing, traffic management, network virtualization, survivability, security, etc. While the
application devices are physically located on the SDN controller, the application functions
are invoked on the controller via the NBI. Hence it also important to consider appropriate
security measures for these applications given this vast scope. Now within the SDN stack,
the NBI between the control plane and application plane typically uses various communication protocols, e.g., Java API, Frenetic, and the Representational State Transfer (REST)
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API. However, these interfaces do not necessarily provide strong security support, thereby
increasing SDN architectural vulnerabilities. Specifically, NBI lacks a defined standard for
security [39] to handle additional attack vectors for malicious actors [40]. For example, compromising the application layer (via the application software) can allow access to the SDN
controller.
However, despite the above concerns, the application layer can also provide additional
security mechanisms by implementing critical security-based applications, e.g., such as intrusion detection system (IDS), intrusion prevention system (IPS), firewall, and also anti-virus
software. These applications can provide a layer of defense against attackers from disrupting the SDN network. In particular, the concept of running an IDS and IPS on the SDN
application plane allows for effective detection and mitigation against the majority of common DoS/DDoS attacks. Briefly, an IDS detects malicious activity and sends an alert on
the system for misuse detection or anomaly detection. Namely, this can be done by running machine learning (ML) algorithms in the application layer to help detect attacks based
upon traffic pattern observations form the data plane (extracted via the SBI). Consider some
studies here now.
Foremost, Ahmed et al. [41] implement a Bayesian ML classifier using a Dirichlet process
mixture model (DPMM) for DoS mitigation by clustering traffic patterns. This approach
was evaluated by measuring the total packet count, source and destination size, and the
duration of the host-to-host connection, using publicly available data sets for attack traffic.
The authors found this solution could detect and identify attack traffic, but still needed a
mitigation approach to mitigate potential attacks. To further address SDN vulnerabilities,
some researchers have also presented method which allow SDN applications to interact with
other network devices to provide monitoring data and better protect against attacks. For
example, KernelDetect [21] is an IDS approach that updates the SDN flow rules with known
threat signatures. This solution is similar to Snort, an open-source IDS that provides packet
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sniffing and traffic analysis i.e., by analyzing data flows and protocols [42]. KernelDetect
is also comparable to the Zeek network security monitor, formerly known as the Bro IDS.
Zeek provides flexible protocol analysis and network monitoring [43]. Along these lines,
T. Chin et al. propose a scheme to improve the IDS mechanisms of Snort and Zeek with
KernelDetect implementing a component to perform string matching, malicious signature
updates, and threat mitigation capabilities. This approach was tested in a hybrid softwarehardware environment against SYN packets sent at various rates; it showed faster detection
and mitigation times than Snort and Zeek. Furthermore, Tennison [44] details another
platform that also compares to Snort and Zeek. Namely, this approach aims to serve as a
complete security platform to monitor and remediate DoS attacks using IDS tools. Also,
Fawcett et al. use Tennison to integrate with the aforementioned open-source IDS tools,
monitor large amounts of data flows, and inspect the SDN packets within specific data
flow selections. Overall, the Tennison solution was evaluated in a software environment
using the ONOS SDN controller against a simulated Packet In message attack. Fawcett
et al. measured the amount of Openflow Packet Out messages and the packet processing
response times. The results showed the SDN controller performance was severely impacted
when this method was not deployed. Namely, Tennison allowed the controller to detect
and block Openflow Packet In messages based on the IP source, IP destination, and port
number. Another approach presented in [22] also provides a distributed firewall with an
IPS on the application layer. With this distributed firewall, Rengaraju et al. monitor SDN
traffic at the frame level and allow the IPS to alert the system of any DoS/DDoS activity
(and subsequently drop any malicious packets). While tested in a software environment, the
authors verified the distributed firewall dropped malicious packets during Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) and SYN flooding attacks. More recently Myint Oo et al. [45]
also introduced an advanced support vector machine (AVSM) scheme to generate DoS attack
alerts on the application plane. This solution can detect, classify, and alert the system
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against flooding attacks. This scheme was implemented and evaluated in a software test-bed
evaluation, and results showed that AVSM was capable of detecting both UDP and TCP
SYN flooding attacks.

2.5

Queuing Analysis of DoS Attacks
Overall, most studies on DoS/DDoS attacks in SDN networks have used simulation, emu-

lation, or test-bed evaluation methodologies. However, some researchers have also developed
more formalized queuing theory (analytical) models to generate broader and deeper insights
into this problem area. Now this work has its origins in earlier studies on queuing analysis of
DoS attacks in regular, i.e., non-SDN, network settings. For example, Wang et al. develop
a two-dimensional Markov chain to track the number of regular and attack packets at a
target host experiencing TCP SYN flooding attacks [46]. Meanwhile [47] presents a queuing
model for DoS attacks on a computer system (host) using exponential traffic arrival patterns.
This framework is then evaluated using sample parameters to quantify the impact of attack
intensity on the queue growth rate (for detection purposes).
Recently, researchers have also developed more specialized queuing models for SDN-based
setups. For example, [48] presents a coupled queuing system to model traffic lookup requests
arriving at a controller from a single switch. A separate buffer is also implemented at the
switch to give priority treatment to packets associated with returning lookup responses,
i.e., as they arrived earlier. The formulation is then solved using Markov chain analysis;
a numerical study is also presented to gauge the impact of traffic arrival rates and flow
duration on packet loss and delay. Meanwhile, Shang et al. present another queuing model
for an OpenFlow network [49]. This work also assumes Poisson arrivals and quantifies service
times at the switches (data plane) and SDN controller (control plane). Finally, Miao et al
look at SDN queuing performance for short, sudden intervals of multimedia traffic [50]. In
particular, traffic patterns are represented using Markov-modulated Poisson processes, and
19

the queuing model incorporates both the SDN controller and a single switch (with a priority
buffer, as per [48]). The authors then apply their solution to study the impacts on flow
table hit probability and service time resource allocation. Although these analytical studies
present some strong contributions, they do not directly address DoS type attacks and/or
incorporate provisions for more advanced attack mitigation capabilities at SDN controllers.

2.6

Open Challenges
Overall, SDN architectures are quite susceptible to large scale DoS/DDoS attacks. Along

these lines, this chapter provides an overview of this domain and outlines specific solutions
to harden each SDN layer. Overall, researchers have proposed many schemes to overcome
the availability issues created by such attacks. Most notably, early detection of network
intrusions/attacks is a crucial requirement for providing effective protection here, i.e., using
methods based upon ML and incorporating them into IDS and IPS solutions. Mitigating
resource exhaust and congestion at the SDN controller and along the critical control pathways
is also another key necessity, i.e., including on NBI and SBI entities. However, it is important
to note that an encompassing DoS/DDoS protection solution that provides protection for all
SDN layers does not exist and may not be feasible. Furthermore, there is also a growing need
to develop more formalized methods to characterize and quantify the impact of DoS/DDoS
attacks on the SDN control plane an associated mitigation methods.
Hence this dissertation focuses on SDN control plane security under DoS/DDoS attacks
using a queuing theory approach. The main goal here is to extend upon the existing work
in this subtopic area and develop more formalized methods that represent the SDN control
plane as an interconnection of queues processing normal (benign) and attack (malicious)
traffic. A key objective is to also introduce new provisions for more advanced SDN controllers
and switches that implement classification methods to separate benign and malicious traffic
requests.
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Table 2.1: Existing SDN DoS/DDoS Protection Solutions by Layer
Existing Solution
Woodpecker[12]
Port Hopping DoS
Mitigation
(PH-DM) [14]
Avant-Guard [15]
Packet-Checker [16]
Flood-Guard [17]
Topo-Guard [18]
LineSwitch [23]
WedgeTail [25]
Selective Blocking
[26]
Flood Defender [19]
Multi-layer Fair
Queue (MLFQ) [20]
Dirichlet Process
Mixture Model
(DPMM) [41]
KernelDetect [42]
Tennison [44]
Distributed Firewall
with IPS [22]
Advanced Support
Vector Machine
(AVSM) [45]

Data Plane

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Control Plane
x
x

Application Plane

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
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Chapter 3: Queuing Models for DoS/DDoS Attacks on SDN Control Plane

As noted earlier in Chapter 2, DoS/DDoS attacks on the SDN control plane can end
up disrupting and degrading traffic flows in data networks. Although many studies have
addressed these concerns, most have tended to focus on smaller empirical testbed setups. As
a result, many of the findings here tend to be closely associated with the system parameters
of the chosen platforms. Meanwhile there are much fewer studies on queue-based modeling
and analysis of DoS attacks in SDN-based networks. However, the limited contributions
in this sub-topic area have not really addressed the integration of separate lookup request
queuing methods at the SDN controller or data plane switches. Many switches provide such
capabilities, which can be further used for mitigation strategies.
In light of the above, this chapter presents and analyzes a novel queuing model for
DoS/DDoS attacks in SDN setups. The overall setup is detailed first along with the requisite notation. Subsequently, this formulation is analyzed for varying packet request arrival
rates in order to provide tractable results. In particular, two service time disciplines at
the SDN controller are modeled here, including exponential and deterministic. Discrete
event simulation analyses is then conducted to analyze the performance and accuracy of the
proposed queuing models. Overall, this work provides a strong basis from which to build
further queuing models for DoS/DDoS mitigation strategies at data plane switches, studied
subsequently in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of Baseline SDN Controller Framework (Single FCFS Queuing)
3.1

Model Overview and Notation
Before presenting the proposed architecture, it is instructive to review the operation of

an SDN-controlled network. In particular, the IP addresses of data packets arriving at a
switch are checked against the local flow table to see if there is an existing entry, i.e., match,
with a flow forwarding rule. If this is the case, it is declared as a table hit and the packet is
processed/forwarded based upon its installed rule. Alternatively, if no match is found, i.e.,
table miss, the switch generates and sends a lookup request to the SDN controller, e.g., via
an OpenFlow Packet In message. The SDN controller then processes these lookup requests
and installs appropriate forwarding rules to all network switches along the path this packet
may flow, e.g., via OpenFlow Flow Mod messages. Note that the SDN controller can also
install rules to drop certain types of packets (leveraged later in Chapter 4). Clearly, then
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the SDN control plane setup can be treated as a queuing system, with buffering of incoming
requests occurring at the SDN controller.

Figure 3.2: Overview of Intelligent SDN Controller Framework for DDoS/DoS Attack
Mitigation (Separate Queuing of Benign and Attack Traffic)
Now based upon the above, a novel queuing framework is presented to model the impact
of DoS/DDoS attacks in SDN controlled networks. Foremost, consider a baseline SDN
controller configuration with a single buffer, as shown in Figure 3.1. This default setup
implements no separation between (benign or malicious) forwarding lookup requests from
data plane switches and instead uses a single first-come-first-serve (FCFS) or FIFO buffer.
Meanwhile, a more intelligent SDN controller configuration is shown in Figure 3.2, where
incoming lookup requests are first classified as either benign or malicious by the controller,
i.e., such as in the MLFQ scheme [20]. In particular, this classification is done using advanced
machine learning algorithms (as per those surveyed in Chapter 2) which are out of the scope
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of the queuing analysis herein. After this classification step, the incoming lookup requests
are then queued into two different buffers which are then served by a scheduler which gives
added weighting to the benign traffic, i.e., dual queue configuration with one for benign
and another for malicious. Overall, this setup effectively throttles potential attack traffic,
thereby also serving in an IPS type role.
A set of variable definitions are now presented to analyze the SDN-based controller buffering setups shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Foremost, consider a network with N data
plane switches managed by a single SDN controller. Here the i-th data plane switch has a
data buffer size of Qi packets, which is used to queue incoming packets which experience a
table lookup miss. Meanwhile, for the baseline configuration shown in Figure 3.1, the SDN
controller has a buffer size of size Qc to queue incoming lookup requests and a service rate of
µC lookup requests per unit time (either exponential average or fixed/deterministic, as will
be analyzed subsequently). Alternatively, for the dual queue configuration the Qbc denotes
the buffer size for benign requests and Qm
c denotes the buffer size for malicious requests (and
for comparison sake it is assumed that Qc = Qbc + Qm
c ). Furthermore, the average rate of
benign traffic lookup requests arriving at the SDN controller from the i-th data plane switch
is denoted by λbi , whereas that for malicious requests is denoted by λm
i requests/unit time.
Carefully note that link transmission times for lookup request messages (at the switches) and
flow rule response messages (at the SDN controller) are assumed to be negligible. Namely,
since most links have transmission speeds in the high gigabits/sec range, associated control
message transmission times will be on the order of a fraction of a microsecond (µs).
Additionally, some further parameters are also defined for the separate (dual) queue
intelligent setup in Figure 3.2. Foremost, a relative scheduler weight, φ, is defined to represent
how much of the SDN controller’s processing capacity is reserved for processing benign
requests, i.e., φµc , where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Meanwhile, the remainder of processing capacity
(1 − φ)µc is left for processing malicious requests. Although most setups will operate with
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φ closer to unity, i.e., to prioritize benign user traffic, there is still a valid rationale for
leaving some capacity to process malicious flows, e.g., in order to characterize the types of
request and IP addresses they are generating for further forensic purposes. In addition, a
misclassification error rate at the SDN controller is also introduced here, i.e., , 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
Namely, this value represents the fraction of incoming malicious lookup requests that are
misclassified as benign, and this parameter is used to capture the additional load impact of
malicious traffic in the dual queue formulation only. Carefully note that another parameter
could also be defined for the fraction of benign lookup requests that are misclassified as
malicious. However, these misclassified requests will actually decrease the impact on the
overall benign (good) traffic, and hence are not modeled here.

3.2

Queuing Model Analysis
Analytical formulations are now developed to help characterize control plane congestion in

SDN networks. In particular, these models leverage queuing theoretic frameworks to quantify
the average behavior of lookup request processing at the SDN controller, including during
large-scale DoS/DDoS attacks. Most notably, several different queuing analyses are applied
here, including M/M/1 and M/D/1 (as denoted by Kendall’s notation) [51]. Consider the
further details.

3.2.1

Baseline SDN Controller Configuration: Single Queue

The baseline SDN controller in Figure 3.1 is first analyzed for the case of exponential
arrival and departure processing times for successive lookup requests, i.e., by applying the
M/M/1 queue formulation [51]. Namely, this setup assumes that table lookup miss events
(generated by both benign and malicious traffic flows) are independent of each other and
hence are characterized by memoryless Poisson processes. Now since the baseline SDN
controller configuration in Figure 3.1 does not implement any separation between benign and
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malicious requests, the additive property of the Poisson process can be applied to compute
the total average request arrival rate from switch i as (λbi + λm
i ) requests/unit time (e.g.,
inbound OpenFlow Packet In messages). Extending upon this, the aggregate Poisson arrival
P
m
b
rate at the SDN controller is given by N
i=1 (λi + λi ). Meanwhile, the request lookup times
at the SDN controller are initially assumed to be exponentially distributed with a rate of
µc . Therefore the output process at the SDN controller also follows a Poisson process with
parameter µc (e.g., outbound OpenFlow Flow Mod messages), and this allows for M/M/1
modeling.
Therefore, based upon the above the relative load of the SDN controller is defined as:

ρsingle
M/M/1

PN

b
i=1 (λi

=

+ λm
i )

(3.1)

µc

Assuming the simpler case of infinite request buffering at the SDN controller (i.e., Qc → ∞)
the average request processing delay (including waiting time and processing time) at the
SDN controller is given by:

single
DM/M/1
=

1
µc (1 −

ρsingle
M/M/1 )

1

=

µc −

PN

b
i=1 (λi

+ λm
i )

(3.2)

and the average queue length is given by:

Lsingle
M/M/1

=

2
(ρsingle
M/M/1 )

1 − ρsingle
M/M/1

assuming stable operation with µc ≥

=

PN

b
i=1 (λi

PN

b
m 2
i=1 (λi + λi ))
P
b
m
µc (µc − N
i=1 (λi + λi ))

(

(3.3)

+ λm
i ).

Finally, the baseline SDN controller is also modeled for the case of fixed (i.e., deterministic) request processing times, i.e., by applying the M/D/1 queue model [51, 52]. In
particular, request arrivals still exhibit exponential arrival times but now the output process
has fixed intervals during busy intervals, i.e.,

1
µc

time units. Again, assuming the simpler
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case of infinite request buffering at the SDN controller (i.e., Qc → ∞) the average request
processing delay at the SDN controller (including waiting time and processing time) is now
given by:

single
DM/D/1

PN
m
b
ρsingle
1
1
M/M/1
i=1 (λi + λi )
+
=
+
=
P
b
m
µc 2µc (1 − ρsingle
µc 2µ(µc − N
i=1 (λi + λi ))
M/M/1 )

(3.4)

and the average queue length is given by:
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M/M/1 )
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PN

PN

=

b
i=1 (λi

m
b
i=1 (λi + λi )
PN
2µc (µc − i=1 (λbi + λm
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(3.5)

+ λm
i ). Carefully note that the M/D/1 model

generally yields lower buffering delays (for equivalent input loads) than the M/M/1 model
owing to more predictable service times. Moreover, this model may be more representative of
real-world SDN controllers with tightly-bounded, i.e., predictable, request lookup/resolution
times (as per optimized software-based search implementations).

3.2.2

Intelligent SDN Controller Configuration: Dual Queue

Extending upon the above analysis, commensurate modeling is also done for the intelligent dual queue SDN controller configuration in Figure 3.2. Recall that this setup features
an intelligent classification entity to separate incoming lookup requests into two different
classes/buffers along with a relative weighting of scheduler capacity specified by φ. Furthermore, a misclassification error rate  is also defined for malicious to benign traffic lookup
requests, see Section 3.1. Based upon the above, the M/M/1 queue formulation is only applied to the benign queue in order to study the impact on well-behaving user traffic. Consider
the details.
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Foremost, as per the additive property of the Poisson process, the total average request
arrival rate from switch i is still given by (λbi + λm
i ) requests/unit time (e.g., inbound OpenFlow Packet In messages). However, the aggregate Poisson arrival rate at the benign queue
P
m
b
after classification is now given by N
i=1 (λi + λi ), i.e., additional fraction of malicious misclassified traffic. Meanwhile the output process at the SDN controller also follows a Poisson
process with parameter φµc (e.g., outbound OpenFlow Flow Mod messages). Hence the
relative load at the benign queue in the SDN controller is now defined as:

ρdual
M/M/1

PN
=

b
i=1 (λi

+ λm
i )
φµc

(3.6)

Using the above, the average request processing delay at the SDN controller for the case of
infinite request buffering (i.e., Qbc → ∞) is given by:
dual
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PN
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and the average queue length is given by:
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Finally, the M/D/1 queue model is also applied to the intelligent SDN dual queue SDN
controller for the case of deterministic request processing times. Assuming the simpler case
of infinite request buffering here, i.e., Qbc → ∞, the average request processing delay at the
SDN controller is given by:
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and the average queue length is given by:
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Performance Analysis Results
Detailed performance analysis results are now presented for the proposed SDN controller

queuing models developed in Section 3.2. In particular, this analysis is done by using the
MATLAB R SimEvents toolkit, which is part of the SimuLink package. This toolkit provides
a graphical block programming tool to analyze discrete event systems, and further details are
also presented in Appendix C. Leveraging this package, detailed SimEvents models are built
for the single queue and (intelligent) dual queue SDN controller setups shown in Figure 3.1
and Figure 3.2. In particular, the former is shown in Figure Figure 3.3 for a sample network
with one SDN controller managing 3 data plane switches. Namely, this setup comprises of
a two-stage queuing system with 6 input packet buffers connected to a main input packet
buffer. Here, a pair of buffers are used to represent benign and malicious traffic at each
switch, i.e., input buffers 1, 3, and 5 represent benign flows arriving at switch 1, 2, and 3;
similarly, input buffers 2, 4, and 6 represent malicious flows arriving at switch 1, 2, and 3.
Meanwhile, the final input buffer represents the SDN controller (with a single shared queue
for benign and malicious traffic, akin to Figure 3.1).
Initial results for this baseline SDN controller setup are now presented. Namely, the SDN
controller processing speed is set to an average of 100,000 requests/sec (i.e., exponential
service time with mean 10 µs) and the packet lookup request rate generated by benign
traffic at all switches (i.e., input buffers 1, 3, and 5) is set to an aggregate value of 30,000
requests/sec (i.e., 10,000 requests at each switch, exponential inter-arrival times with mean
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Figure 3.3: MATLAB R Simuevents Model Topology for Sample 3 Node SDN Network

100 µs). Meanwhile, the packet lookup request rates generated by malicious traffic at all
switches (i.e., input buffers 2, 4, and 6) are varied to test different attack intensities. These
values imply an M/M/1 setup with a fixed (background) benign traffic load of 30% of
the SDN controller lookup processing capacity. Accordingly, Figure 3.4 plots the average
request processing delay values measured at the SDN controller for increasing attack intensity
and also compares them to the ideal values, i.e., Eq. 3.4. As expected, lookup latencies
exhibit super-linear (exponential) increase with increased attack rates. For example at the
average processing delay approaches 0.1 sec per request for an attack rate of 50,000 malicious
requests/sec (80% aggregate load). In addition, these simulation results (with the SimEvents
toolkit) also show close alignment with the predicted values. Next, Figure 3.5 also shows
the average number of requests at the SDN controller (including in those in the buffer and
being processed). Again, these values closely match the predicted averages in Eq. 3.3 and
also exhibit a sharp rise for higher attack rates, i.e., close to 20-fold higher.
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Figure 3.4: Average Wait Time: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load,
Exponential Arrival and Service Times

Figure 3.5: Average Num. Requests: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load,
Exponential Arrival and Service Times
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Figure 3.6: Sample Request Processing Times at SDN Controller

For reference sake, some detailed screenshots from the SimEvents toolkit are also shown
for some sample simulation runs. In particular, Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show the measured
request processing delays and SDN (lookup request) buffer lengths, respectively, for 20%
processing load (about 20,000 requests/sec). The former plots reveals an initial “ramp up”
stage where an idle/empty SDN controller is gradually loaded and then settles into a steady
state operating range of around 2 lookup times (20 µs). Meanwhile the queuing behavior
shows alternating busy and idle periods with a relatively low average buffer occupancy of
around 1.5 requests.
The above tests are then repeated by modifying the SimEvents model to have a fixed
SDN controller processing speed of 100,000 requests/sec (i.e., 10 µs deterministic service
time). Again, the aggregate benign traffic lookup request rate (from input buffers 1, 3, and
5) is maintained at 30,000 requests/sec (i.e., exponential inter-arrival times of 10 µs at each
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Figure 3.7: Sample Buffer Length at SDN Controller

switch) and the aggregate malicious traffic lookup request rates are varied (from input buffers
2, 4, and 6). This setup reflects a baseline (single queue) M/D/1 model, and the resultant
analysis and simulation results are plotted in Figure 3.8 (average processing delay at the
SDN controller) and Figure 3.9 (average number of requests at the SDN controller). Overall,
these findings show close agreement between the simulation averages and their predicted
idealized values (as per Eqs. 3.4 and 3.5). As expected, the deterministic processing time at
the SDN controller now gives notably lower delays and queue lengths at higher loads, i.e.,
approximately 50% lower.
Next, simulation analysis is also conducted for the intelligent SDN controller configuration
in Figure 3.2. Recall that this setup classifies and separates benign and malicious lookup
requests into separate queues and assigns appropriate fractions of SDN controller processing
capacity to each, i.e., φ and (1 − φ), respectively. Hence for the analysis herein, φ = 0.95,
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Figure 3.8: Average Wait Time: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load,
Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

Figure 3.9: Average Num. Requests: Baseline SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load,
Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times
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implying that most processing capacity is used to handle legitimate lookup requests, with the
remaining 5% reserved for limited processing of malicious attacks (for forensic requirements).
Additionally, a misclassification error rate, , is also defined in Section 3.1 to represent the
fraction of malicious requests (mis)classified as benign and increasing load. Therefore two
misclassification rates are evaluated to assess the impact of (advanced machine learning
algorithm) classifier accuracy in Figure 3.2, i.e., including  = 0.05 and 0.15. In particular,
the latter value is chosen to reflect challenging scenarios such as zero-day attacks where it
may be difficult to identify malicious flows in the short-term. As per the tests for the baseline
case, the SDN controller processing speed is set to an average of 100,000 requests/sec (i.e.,
exponential service time with mean 10 µs) of which 95% is assigned to the benign queue.
Similarly, the aggregate benign traffic lookup request rates (i.e., from input buffers 1, 3, and
5) are also kept the same as for the baseline case, i.e., 30% of SDN controller capacity at
30,000 requests/sec (i.e., exponential inter-arrival times at each switch with mean 100 mus).
Finally, the lookup request rates for malicious traffic (i.e., from input buffers 2, 4, and 6) are
varied to test different attack intensities.
Foremost, Figure 3.10 plots the average request processing delay values for benign requests (via the SDN controller’s benign request queue) for increasing attack intensities and
different misclassification error rates. The idealized values predicted by Eq. 3.9 are also
shown here. Now since it is assumed that a majority of the malicious requests, i.e., 1 − ,
are effectively sidelined by the classifier, the SDN controller can now handle much larger
request rates. Overall, the findings confirm that a higher degree of classifier accuracy (i.e.,
95% for  = 0.05) gives a very negligible increase in processing delay, even at extreme loads
close to 500,000 lookup requests/sec. However, if the classifier accuracy declines to 85%
(i.e.,  = 0.15) then the delay begins to rise in a non-linear manner again, in the high tens
of microseconds. These increased delays can be very problematic for services with high
QoS requirements, e.g., such as real-time voice communications. Again, the values from the
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Figure 3.10: Average Wait Time: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load,
Exponential Arrival and Service Times

Figure 3.11: Average Num. Requests: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic
Load, Exponential Arrival and Service Times
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Figure 3.12: Average Wait Time: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic Load,
Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

SimEvents simulation models exhibit close agreement with their predicted values. Similarly,
Figure 3.11 plots the average number of requests at the benign traffic queue in the SDN controller. Again, these findings mirror the results for the average delay, and show a rapid rise
in buffering for increased loads and lower classifier accuracy. Overall, further tests confirm
that the misclassification rate (classifier accuracy) is a critical parameter which can increase
delay and buffering in a non-linear manner.
Finally, the intelligent SDN controller configuration is also tested for a fixed lookup processing speed of 100,000 requests/sec (i.e., 10 µs deterministic service time). Furthermore,
the aggregate benign traffic lookup request rate is maintained at 30,000 requests/sec (with
exponential inter-arrival times) and the fraction of processing capacity dedicated for legitimate requests is also maintained at φ = 0.95. The respective results for average delay and
average number of requests (at the benign traffic queue in the SDN controller) are shown
in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13, respectively. Again, these findings show close agreement
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Figure 3.13: Average Num. Requests: Intelligent SDN Controller, 30% Benign Traffic
Load, Exponential Arrival and Fixed Service Times

between the simulation averages and predicted analytical values (as per Eqs. 3.9 and 3.10).
Here the fixed processing times at the SDN controller give reduced delays and buffering
requirements under increased misclassification rates. For example, the average delay for
a malicious traffic rate of 350,000 request/sec for φ = 0.15 is almost twice as large, i.e.,
compare results in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.12.
Carefully note that the above results only present metrics for the benign (traffic lookup
request) queue in the intelligent SDN controller as it has direct impact on the performance
of well-behaving user flows. Corresponding values are not presented for the malicious (traffic lookup request queue) which are expected to show diverging unstable behaviors under
extreme attack loads, owing to the inherent throttling done by the scheduler in Figure 3.2,
i.e., centralized IPS-type functionality at the SDN controller.
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Chapter 4: Mitigation Strategies for DoS/DDoS Attacks

The previous chapter presented some detailed queuing models and analyses for SDN
controllers experiencing DoS/DDoS attacks. Although this work presents a good study on
the effects of DoS/DDoS attacks at the SDN control plane, newer methods are proposing
more distributed mitigation strategies. In particular, the data plane switches themselves
can run their own classifier algorithms to separate out benign and malicious traffic flows.
This approach prevents malicious traffic from impacting the SDN controllers and tries to
limit the effects of DoS/DDoS attack to ingress data plane switches. This methodology can
also simplify the processing burden at the SDN controller itself, i.e., by distributing traffic
classification tasks to the data plane switches.
In light of the above, this chapter presents novel queuing models for DoS/DDoS mitigation at the network edge. In particular, more advanced data plane switches are used to
classify and separate incoming packet lookup requests as benign or malicious before they
are sent to the SDN controller. The overall setup is detailed first along with additional notation. Subsequently, this formulation is analyzed using queuing theory for varying packet
request arrival rates for two service time disciplines at the switches, including exponential
and deterministic. Simulation analyses is then conducted to evaluate the performance of this
approach and models.

4.1

Model Overview and Notation
Recall that the intelligent dual queue SDN architecture in Chapter 3 implements sepa-

ration of benign and malicious lookup requests at the centralized controller entity. In the
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Figure 4.1: Overview of edge buffering of packet lookup requests
proposed framework here, this approach is now replicated at all the switches, as shown in
Figure 4.1. Namely, each switch implements dual queuing and uses a classifier to separate
the incoming lookup requests into two different buffers for benign or malicious requests,
respectively. Again, this classification is done using advanced machine learning algorithms
(which are out of the scope of the queuing analysis herein). Furthermore, a link scheduler
is also used to control lookup request to the main SDN controller, i.e., OpenFlow Packet In
message transmissions. Hence since traffic separation is now done at the edges, the main
controller can use a baseline single queue design, as per Figure 3.1, which implements no
separation between (benign or malicious) forwarding lookup requests. Overall, this setup
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reflects a two-stage hierarchical queuing setup where the edge switches effectively throttle
potential attack traffic, i.e., thereby serving in an IPS-type role.

4.2

Queuing Model Analysis
Detailed analytical formulations are now developed to model control plane congestion

for the more advanced data plane switches. Again, these models leverage queuing theoretic
frameworks to quantify the average behavior of lookup request processing at the edge, including during large-scale DoS/DDoS attacks. Most notably, several different queuing analyses
are applied here, including M/M/1 and M/D/1. Overall, the analysis here re-uses much
of the variable notation introduced in Section 3.2. For simplicity’s sake, and without loss
of generality, it is also assumed that the fractional link rates for benign request message
transmission is the same at all switches, i.e., φ. Similarly, it is also assumed that the misclassification error rate for the classifiers at all the switches is the same, i.e., . Consider the
further details now.
The case of exponential request lookup times at the SDN controller is treated first, i.e.,
M/M/1 model assumption. Assuming negligible request message transmission times from
the switch links, the incoming stream of lookup requests from switch i arrive at a rate of
(λbi + λm
i ) requests/unit time. Now given the additive property of the Poisson process, the
total average request arrival rate (from the benign queues at all switches after classification)
P
b
m
is also given by N
i=1 (λi + λi ), i.e., additional fraction of malicious traffic misclassified as
benign. Furthermore, assuming a simplified single queue setup at the SDN controller (as
noted above), the output from the SDN controller will also follow a Poisson process with
parameter µc (e.g., outbound OpenFlow Flow Mod messages). Hence the aggregate load at
the SDN controller is given by:

ρedge
M/M/1

PN
=

b
i=1 (λi

+ λm
i )

µc

(4.1)
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Using the above, the average request processing delay at the SDN controller for the case of
infinite request buffering (i.e., Qbc → ∞) is given by:
edge
DM/M/1
=

1
µc (1 −

ρedge
M/M/1 )

=

1
µc −

PN

b
m
i=1 (λi + λi )

(4.2)

and the average queue length is given by:

Ledge
M/M/1

=

2
(ρedge
M/M/1 )

1 − ρedge
M/M/1

assuming stable operation with µc ≥

P
b
m 2
( N
i=1 (λi + λi ))
=
PN
µc (µc − i=1 (λbi + λm
i ))

PN

b
i=1 (λi

(4.3)

+ λm
i ).

Next, consider the case of deterministic request lookup processing times at the SDN
controller, i.e., M/D/1 model assumption. Assuming the simpler case of infinite request
buffering here, i.e., Qbc → ∞, the average request processing delay at the SDN controller is
given by:

edge
DM/D/1

PN
m
b
ρedge
1
1
M/M/1
i=1 (λi + λi )
=
+
=
+
P
b
m
µc 2µc (1 − ρedge
µc 2µc (µc − N
i=1 (λi + λi ))
M/M/1 )

(4.4)

and the average queue length is given by:

Ledge
M/D/1

=

2
(ρedge
M/M/1 )

2(1 − ρedge
M/M/1 )

assuming stable operation with µc ≥
4.3

PN

PN

=

b
i=1 (λi

m
b
i=1 (λi + λi )
PN
2µc (µc − i=1 (λbi + λm
i ))

(4.5)

+ λm
i ).

Performance Analysis Results
Detailed performance analysis results are also presented for the proposed edge queuing

model for data plane switches. Again, this effort utilizes the MATLAB R SimEvents toolkit
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to implement dual queuing of benign and malicious lookup requests at the switches shown
in Figure 4.1. Specifically, this is done by replicating the dual queue model of the intelligent
SDN controller (Figure 3.2, Chapter 3) at each switch. The same network topology from
Chapter 3 is also re-used here, featuring a SDN controller managing 3 data plane switches.
Again, a pair of buffers are used to represent benign and malicious traffic at each switch,
i.e., input buffers 1, 3, and 5 represent benign flows arriving at switch 1, 2, and 3 and
similarly, input buffers 2, 4, and 6 represent malicious flows arriving at switch 1, 2, and
3. The two queues at each switch are also further managed by a scheduler which assigns
95% of its capacity to handle benign requests, i.e., φ = 0.95 (across all switches). Similarly,
two different misclassification error rates are tested here, i.e.,  = 0.05 and 0.15, to assess
the impact of classifier accuracy on performance (across all switches). As noted in the
analysis (Section 4.2), it is also assumed that the message transmission times on the links
are negligible. Finally, as per Chapter 3, the SDN controller processing speed is set to an
average of 100,000 requests/sec (i.e., exponential service time with mean 10 µs) and the
aggregate benign traffic lookup request rates (i.e., from input buffers 1, 3, and 5) are set
to 30% of the SDN controller capacity at 30,000 requests/sec (i.e., exponential inter-arrival
times at each switch with mean 100 µs). Meanwhile the lookup request rates for malicious
traffic (i.e., from input buffers 2, 4, and 6) are varied to test different attack intensities.
Foremost, the average request processing delay values for benign requests are shown in
Figure 4.2 for increasing attack intensities and different misclassification error rates, including
both ideal values and simulation measurements. These results again show the gain with
increased classifier accuracy ( = 0.05) with delays averaging close to 20 µs at even extreme
attack loads. Conversely for lower classifier accuracy ( = 0.15) the resultant increase in
delay is significant, i.e., 5 times higher at extreme loads. Note that these results generally
match those for the intelligent SDN controller in Section 3.3, Figure 3.12. However the
proposed setup here imposes much less processing burden on the SDN controller, since the
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Figure 4.2: Average wait time: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential arrival
and service times

Figure 4.3: Average num. requests: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential
arrival and service times
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majority of the malicious requests are stopped at the switches (and hence the SDN controller
can run a simple FCFS queue discipline). Furthermore, Figure 4.3 also plots the average
number of requests at the SDN controller, and also confirms increased buffering requirements
for lower classifier accuracy. Again, the values from the SimEvents simulation models exhibit
close agreement with their predicted values.
Finally, the SimEvents model is also modified to test the setup in Figure 4.1 for a fixed
lookup processing speed of 100,000 packets/sec (i.e., 10 µs deterministic service time). Again,
the aggregate benign traffic lookup request rate is maintained at 30,000 requests/sec (with
exponential inter-arrival times) and the fraction of processing capacity dedicated for legitimate requests is also maintained at φ = 0.95. Based on this, Figure 4.4 plots the average
delay at the SDN controller, and these findings show notably lower values at higher loads
(especially for increased misclassification rates). Here the fixed processing times at the SDN
controller give reduced delays and buffering requirements. Finally, Figure 4.5 also plots the
average number of requests at the SDN controller, and these values also show notable reductions over the exponential service time case. For example, the average number of requests in
the system for a malicious traffic rate of 350,000 request/sec and φ = 0.15 is almost twice as
high in comparing Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5. Finally, these results also show close proximity
between the simulation averages and predicted analytical values (as per Eqs. 4.4 and 4.5).
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Figure 4.4: Average wait time: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential arrival
and fixed service times

Figure 4.5: Average num. requests: Switch 1, 30% benign traffic load, exponential
arrival and fixed service times
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Chapter 5: Real-World Testbed Evaluation

The previous efforts in Chapters 3 and 4 present some in-depth queuing analyses of
DoS/DDoS attacks on SDN controllers and data plane switches. Now as per the survey
in Chapter 2, many researchers have also built and studied smaller SDN-based network
setups in laboratory environments to recreate/analyze the impact of various types of DoS
attacks. In many cases, these studies have used emulated network environments, e.g., using
the Mininet tool. Although these setups provide a realistic virtual networking environment,
it remains to be seen if the associated results translate to live real-world environments. Hence
even though these efforts provide important contributions, there is a further need to conduct more expansive evaluation of such attacks on larger SDN-based network infrastructures
found in real-world operational settings. This is a difficult challenge as it is hard to gain
access to “live” network infrastructures for experimental purposes. It is here that the NSFfunded Global Environment for Networking Innovations (GENI) testbed facility provides an
invaluable resource for researchers to evaluate proposed mechanisms. Specifically, this stateof-the-art infrastructure allows for the creation and testing of a range of SDN topologies
using any set of preferred software tools (installed on end host devices).
Leveraging the above, this chapter presents some initial work on setting up and using the
GENI testbed for DoS type attack evaluations. This type of research is also very important
as most simulation methods do no deploy actual SDN-based protocols on live platforms
with their own operating systems and applications [53]. Hence this chapter details a GENI
emulation build that features a live SDN controller managing real network switches using the
OpenFlow communication protocol. End host systems are also connected to these switches to
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run real-world applications and generate (attack) traffic. Sample results are then presented
to show the overall method for initiate DoS attacks and gauging the impact of DoS traffic on
SDN control and data planes switches. Overall, the intent here is to lay the groundwork for
further development and testing of large scale DoS/DDoS attack detection and mitigation
in SDN-based networks.

Figure 5.1: 5 switch/5-host SDN topology slice in NSF GENI testbed

5.1

NSF GENI Testbed Setup
The NSF GENI testbed infrastructure provides a state-of-the-art facility to build and

evaluate SDN test case scenarios. In particular, GENI allows users to request/reserve distributed network resources, termed as “slices”, and design arbitrary switch topologies and
end-host configurations for testing purposes. Leveraging the above, a 5 switch network topology slice was created in GENI to model an initial test SDN infrastructure network to study
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the impact of DoS attacks. This network is shown in Figure 5.1 and also features separate end host systems connected to each switch. In the above case, the slice was reserved
at several InstaGENI facilities by carefully selecting sites with adequate network resources,
including those at the University of Kentucky (Lexington, KY) and Ohio State University
(Columbus, OH). Some further details are now presented.

Figure 5.2: Screenshot of jFed toolkit and GUI views
Overall, the GENI testbed network is comprised of 11 virtual nodes and 12 links. All
nodes are Xen-based Emulab virtual machines, and each is assigned a Layer 3 IPv4 address
and a Layer 2 MAC address. Of these, 5 nodes were configured as OpenFlow Virtual Switch
(OVS) switches, i.e., s1-s4, whereas 5 other nodes were designated as end hosts, i.e., host1host5 (with each connected to a dedicated switch). Furthermore, another node was also
connected to all 5 OVS switches and designated as the OpenFlow SDN controller. In particular, this controller was installed with the Floodlight SDN controller software. Carefully
note that virtual nodes in GENI are not switches by default and have to be further configured
with OVS software and then coupled with an Ethernet bridge to serve as the SDN switch.
Finally the jFed toolkit [54, 55] was also used to design and reserve the topology slices and
provide access to all virtual hosts and switches. This solution provides a GUI-based interface
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for users to define slices and build out the network host, a sample screenshot of which is also
shown in Figure 5.2.
Now a full range of software can also be installed on the GENI end hosts to generate packet
data traffic and essentially emulate both benign and malicious sources. Hence for testing
purposes here, the hping3 command toolkit was used for these purposes. Furthermore, the
Linux-based systat and vnstat tools were also installed to monitor performance behaviors
and collect measurement data, i.e., during both normal and attack conditions. Specifically,
appropriate monitors were placed at all the OVS switch nodes as well as the SDN controller
host. This setup allowed close examination of the network activity during hping3 generated
flood events. Carefully note that further efforts can also make use of more specialized
DoS traffic generation tools to generate malicious attack traffic, e.g., such as Metasploit,
DDOSIM, XOIC, etc.

5.2

Evaluation Study
Some sample empirical test results are now presented with the GENI testbed topology

in Figure 5.1. These runs are designed to inject varying traffic profiles into the SDN testbed
topology by adjusting several hping3 command parameters, i.e., such as inter-packet arrival
times, source addresses, and destination addresses. Furthermore, both benign (baseline) and
interfering malicious traffic flows are generated here, as detailed next.

5.2.1

Baseline (Normal) Traffic

Packet traffic is sent from host h1 to host h5, Figure 5.1, to represent benign user flows.
Namely, the source node injects ping requests at two different inter-arrival times to emulate
varying traffic intensities, i.e., 1 sec and 0.2 sec. Furthermore, packet transmissions are
started after 60 seconds and run for 240 seconds yielding a total test duration of 300 seconds
(with clear delineation of pre-/post-attack intervals). Note that the initial ping request (to
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the destination IP address) is first sent to the SDN controller via an OpenFlow Packet In
message, which resolves the end-to-end route and installs the appropriate forwarding rules
at the switches via OpenFlow Flow Mod messages.

5.2.2

Malicious Attack Traffic

In order to stress the SDN control plane, interfering traffic is also generated and sent
from host h2 to host h5, Figure 5.1, representing malicious attack traffic. In particular,
several different hping intervals are used here to vary attack intensity, including 10 µs and
25 µs. Furthermore, randomized (non-existent, “spoofed”) destination addresses are also
used in order to stress the SDN control plane, i.e., by using the hping3 random destination
option. This approach is akin to TCP SYN flood attacks. Now as discussed in Section 2.3,
unknown destination IP addresses will generate constant table lookup miss events at the
ingress switch and result in further lookup requests to the SDN controller i.e., OpenFlow
Packet In messages. The controller will in turn generate appropriate OpenFlow Packet Out
responses to the switches. As such, these lookups can cause increased processor and memory
utilization at the switch nodes and controller, as well as message transfer delays.

5.2.3

Sample Results

Sample results from the live GENI topology are presented for the two benign traffic ping
intervals in Table 5.1 (for 1 sec) and Table 5.2 (0.2 sec). The results focus on the ping
round trip times (RTT) measurements, including minimum, maximum, mean, and standard
deviation. Foremost, these findings show roughly equal mean RTT values for both 10 µs
and 25 µs ping times (at host h2) for malicious packets, i.e., approximately 2.2 sec for 1 sec
benign traffic pings in Table 5.1 and 2.1 sec for benign traffic pings in Table 5.2. Also, note
that the slight increase in average RTT values for the 1.0 sec benign traffic ping times can be
attributed to the larger packet spacing (i.e., akin to a reduced sampling rate). Next, these
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results also show that increased amounts of traffic give increased maximum RTT times, i.e.,
Table 5.2. Finally, it is noted that instances of packet loss were also observed for the shorter
malicious traffic ping times of 10 µs.
Table 5.1: 1 sec benign traffic ping interval (hosts h1-h5)
h2 hping

RTT

RTT

RTT

RTT

interval

Min.

Avg.

Max.

St Dev.

10 µs

1.141 s

2.223 s

8.994 s

0.338 s

25 µs

1.338 s

2.224 s

8.053 s

0.297 s

Table 5.2: 0.2 sec benign traffic ping interval (hosts h1-h5)
h2 hping

RTT

RTT

RTT

RTT

interval

Min.

Avg.

Max.

St Dev.

10 µs

1.196 s

2.122 s

9.432 s

0.287 s

25 µs

1.255 s

2.153 s

8.398 s

0.269 s

Overall, there are a few approaches and studies on SDN control plane security that use
existing attack data, however publicly available data sets are vastly outdated.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions

6.1

Conclusions
This dissertation addresses the problem of large-scale DoS/DDoS cyber-attacks on SDN-

based network infrastructures. This is an area of growing concern as more enterprises and
network service providers start to deploy these centralized control setups to improve costefficiency and streamline their service provisioning. In particular, this study applies formal
queuing theory to study the impact of such attacks on the SDN control plane and also
proposes some appropriate mitigation strategies using data plane scheduler mechanisms for
traffic throttling. A summary of this dissertation effort is now presented along with future
directions to expand the work.

6.2

Findings Summary
Foremost, Chapter 2 presents a detailed survey of the latest research work on DoS/DDoS

attacks in SDN networks as well as related efforts in queue modeling. Next, Chapter 3
presents several novel queuing model frameworks to capture the effects of DoS-type attacks
at the centralized SDN controller. In particular, this includes a baseline model (with no separation between benign and malicious lookup requests) as well as an intelligent design (with
a classifier to separate benign and malicious lookup requests into two queues). Foremost,
the simulation findings confirm the accuracy of the derived analytical models. In addition,
results also show that the baseline model yields unacceptable performance (in terms of excessive delays and buffering) due to its lack of separation. Meanwhile, the intelligent dual
queue SDN controller setup is much more effective at extreme attack loads. However, this
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design is very sensitive to classifier accuracy, with misclassification rates over 10% yielding
notable increases in delay and buffering. Extending upon the above, Chapter 4 presents
a novel queuing model to capture advanced switch designs implementing edge traffic classification (i.e., mitigation). This setup yields notably reduced complexity and processing
burden at the SDN controller by distributing the burden of traffic classification across the
data plane. Again, the findings show increased sensitivity to classifier accuracy. Finally,
Chapter 5 outlines a testbed framework for further studying DoS/DDoS attacks in realworld network settings using the NSF GENI facility. Some initial results are also presented
for a small test topology by using ping traffic to recreate harmful traffic flows. Overall, the
findings here demonstrate that NSF GENI provides a very functional capability to study
DoS/DDoS attacks in a real SDN network. However, further load-based testing is required
to ascertain the performance parameters of SDN controllers in GENI, i.e., in terms of their
request processing and buffering capacities. This information can then be used to gauge
against the derived theoretical analysis presented herein.

6.3

Future Work Directions
Overall, this thesis dissertation presents some of the first detailed queuing and scheduling

models for capturing the effects of DoS/DDoS attacks and mitigation strategies in networks
using an SDN-based control. As a result, this work presents a very good baseline from which
to delve into further research topics. From the analytical perspective, extended formulations
can be developed for more complex short and sudden traffic arrival models, i.e., to further
improve modeling of real-world traffic patterns. Namely, further models can be built to
characterize the traffic generation processes of typical botnets launching DoS/DDoS attacks,
particularly from individual low-rate compromised devices (coordinated by larger botnets).
These findings can be used to characterize and identify the most applicable (and aggregated)
arrivals processes to develop more customized and accurate queuing models.
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In addition, more in-depth testbed evaluation can also be conducted by extending upon
the setup developed in Chapter 5. Foremost, larger topology slices can be designed and automated scripting tools used to recreate larger DoS and even DDoS attack scenarios (multiple
hping sources). More realistic conditions can also be created by installing more advanced
DOS traffic generation tools on the end hosts, e.g., such as Metasploit, DDOSIM, XOIC,
etc. Additionally, real-world DDoS attack trace data can also be inserted here. Overall,
these methods can be used to characterize and quantify the capabilities of Floodlight SDN
controller in GENI, e.g., lookup request buffer size, request processing rates, OpenFlow control messaging speeds, etc. Next, several machine learning classification algorithms can also
be adapted and programmed (at the SDN controller host) to classify incoming requests as
per the dual queue setup described in Chapter 3. This approach can provide a realistic
assessment of traffic misclassification rates. Finally, the DoS/DDoS mitigation framework in
Chapter 4 can also be evaluated by implementing specific modifications to the OVS software
to implement separate message queues at the data plane switches.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

API : Application program interface
AVSM : Advanced support vector machine
CPU : Central processing unit
DoS : Denial of service
DES : Discrete event simulation
DDoS : Distributed denial of service
DPPM : Dirichlet process mixture model
DNS : Domain Name System
FPGA : Field programmable gate array
FIFO : First in first out
forCES : Forward and Control Element Separation
GENI : Global Environment for Networking Innovations
GUI : Graphical user interface
ICMP : Internet Control Message Protocol
IDS : Intrusion detection system
IoT : Internet of Things
62

IP : Internet Protocol
IT : Information technology
IPS : Intrusion prevention system
MAC : Media access control
MitM : Man in the middle
ML : Machine learning
MLFQ : Multi-layer fair queuing
NBI : Northbound interface
NOS : Network Operating System
ODL : Open Daylight
ONOS : Open Network Operating System
OSI : Open Systems Interconnection
OVDSB : Open vSwitch Database
OVS : Open vSwitch
PCEP : Path Computation Element Communication Protocol
PH-DM : Port Hopping-Dos Mitigation
QoS : Quality of Service
REST : Representational State Transfer
RTT : Round Trip Time
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SBI : Southbound Interface
SDN : Software Defined Network
SYN : Synchronize
TCP : Transmission Control Protocol
UDP : User Datagram Protocol
VPN : Virtual private network
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions

A listing of all variable definitions defined in this thesis dissertation is as follows:

B.1

Chapter 3

• Qc : Lookup request size at SDN controller
• Qbc : Lookup request buffer size at SDN controller for benign traffic (dual queue)
• Qm
c : Lookup request buffer size at SDN controller for malicious traffic (queue queue)
• λbi : Average rate of benign lookup requests at switch i
• λm
i : Average rate of malicious lookup requests at switch i
• µc : Lookup request service rate at SDN controller
• φ : Fraction of processing capacity for benign traffic at SDN controller (dual queue)
•  : Malicious traffic mis-classification rate at SDN controller
• ρsingle
M/M/1 : Relative load at the SDN controller
• ρdual
M/M/1 : Relative load at the benign queue in SDN controller (dual queue)
B.2

Chapter 4

• Qi : Data buffer size at switch i
• Qbi : Lookup request buffer size at switch i for benign traffic (dual queue)
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• Qm
i : Lookup request buffer size at switch i for malicious traffic (queue queue)
• φi : Fraction of processing capacity for benign traffic at switch i (dual queue)
• i : Malicious traffic mis-classification rate at switch i
• δi : Processing and communication delay to switch i
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Appendix C: Overview of Queuing Simulation Toolkit

As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, the queuing simulations for the SDN controller setups are
done using the MATLAB R SimEvents discrete event simulation toolkit (which is also part of
the Simulink package). This toolkit provides a mechanism to design and test various models
to obtain experimental results. Now building queuing models with SimEvents requires additional MATLAB R libraries as this toolkit does not come installed in the default R2019a
version. Hence SimEvents was made available after purchasing an additional license for use
through USF.
Upon installation, SimEvents basically provides several sample discrete event system
models to view and manipulate using a graphical user interface (GUI). Most notably, this
includes a sample M/M/1 queue model, as shown in Figure C.1. Overall, this model presents
a unique hands-on experience with the toolkit and allows for further modification and customization. Hence this dissertation effort leveraged this SimEvents model to build and test
more advanced multi-queue models for a network comprising of an SDN controller and multiple data plane switches. Some further details are presented here.
Foremost, each queue in the SimEvents model is driven by an arrival process, as noted by
the entity inter-arrival time depicted in Figure C.1. Hence users can directly specify various
inter-arrival time distribution parameters. For example this can be done by adjusting the
exponential arrival time using the GUI knob symbol or by directly editing the customer
arrival rate in the Simulink Function. Note that the inter-arrival process here represents
a Poisson process owing to exponential inter-arrival times (memoryless). Now SimEvents
provides a very flexible GUI-based setup to allow users to develop and test customized
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discrete event simulation models. In particular, the library browser, shown in Figure C.2,
presents a wide range of elements that can be dragged/dropped/interconnected to build any
arbitrary discrete event processing system. Some of the most frequently used items here
include the following:
• Entity Queue
• Entity Generator
• Entity Server
• Entity Terminator
• Simulink Function
• Sequence Viewer
• Scope
• Knob
Now once a SimEvents model has been developed and its parameters assigned, a user
can run it for any specified duration by simply entering a time in the upper right hand-side
(and selecting the run GUI button denoted by an arrow in the toolkit). A wide range of
probes can also be inserted into the model in order to monitor, collect, and plot specific
metrics and statistics. For example, Figure C.1 illustrates two sample probes to track queue
queue waiting time and server utilization. Finally, a sample probe output is also shown for
an M/M/1 queuing simulation run in Figure C.3 for the case of 1.0 second average service
time and 0.5 second average inter-arrival time (showing close agreement to the theoretical
average wait time of 1.0 seconds).
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Figure C.1: MATLAB R SimEvents sample M/M/1 queue

Figure C.2: MATLAB R SimEvents library browser
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Figure C.3: Sample output simulation runs from MATLAB R SimEvents
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